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Abstract
Incompatibility in markets with network effects can either benefit or harm consumers. Incom-
patibility reduces consumers’ ability to “mix and match” components offered by different sellers,
but can also be associated with changes in product attributes that might benefit consumers.
In this paper, we estimate the effects of incompatibility in a classic hardware/software market:
ATM cards and machines. Our empirical model allows us to measure the indirect network effect
relating the value of ATM cards to ATM availability. It also allows us to measure the effects
of incompatibility as measured by ATM fees. Our sample contains a relatively discrete move
toward incompatibility after 1996, when banks began to impose surcharges on non-customers
using their ATM machines. We provide estimates of the partial equilibrium effects of increased
incompatibility on consumer welfare, finding that ATM fees ceteris paribus reduce the indirect
network effect associated with other banks’ ATMs. However, a surge in ATM deployment ac-
companies the shift to surcharging and in many cases completely offsets the reduction in welfare
associated with higher fees. This suggests that welfare analyses should consider the interaction
between incompatibility and changes in product attributes.
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21 Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the importance of markets in which
there are network effects: complementary relationships in demand for products that may be pro-
duced and sold by different firms. Policy concerns in these markets often center on the effects of
incompatibility between components sold by separate firms. Incompatibility reduces consumers’
options, by preventing them from matching components sold by different firms. However, incom-
patibility may also lead firms to change their product characteristics, benefiting consumers.1 The
equilibrium relationship between incompatibility and consumer welfare is therefore unclear.
In this paper, we estimate the impact of network effects and incompatibility in a classic “hard-
ware/software” industry: Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and ATM cards. In this market,
network effects arise because consumers can use ATM cards and ATMs owned by different banks.
This leads to a complementary indirect network effect through which one bank’s ATM fleet size
affects consumers’ willingness to pay for other banks’ ATM cards.2 Furthermore, while consumers
may in principle use any bank’s ATM card at any other bank’s ATM, banks impose fees for such
“mix and match” transactions, introducing incompatibility between cards and competitors’ ma-
chines. There are two such fees. A surcharge is paid by the consumer to the owner of the ATM (a
bank or independent service operator). The cardholder’s own bank may also impose a foreign fee
for such transactions.
In the limit, these fees can create complete incompatibility between cards and competitors’
ATMs, but at lower levels they create partial incompatibility. In our empirical work, we focus
primarily on surcharging as a metric of incompatibility, though we also control for the existence
of foreign fees. This emphasis stems from the nature of our data, which cover a period that
exhibits a regime change in surcharging; until 1996 the largest networks barred banks from imposing
surcharges, while after 1996 surcharges became widespread.3 This represents a relatively discrete
shift toward incompatibility. Foreign fees, on the other hand, remain roughly constant across and
within banks throughout our sample period.
The key empirical question that we examine is whether greater incompatibility leaves consumers
better or worse off. While incompatibility ceteris paribus leaves consumers worse off because it
1See Katz and Shapiro (1994) for a summary of the literature and its key points.
2“Direct” network effects occur when an adopter generates benefits for other users of the same product, as in
a communications network. For a discussion of the distinction and its theoretical relevance, see Katz and Shapiro
(1994).
3Sixteen states overrode the ban prior to 1997; we account for this in the empirical work below. See Prager (2001)
for an examination of surcharging prior to 1997.
3reduces their mix and match options, it may change firms’ incentives to invest in the quality of
their network components; this incentive may counterbalance the harmful effects of incompatibility.
In our setting, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that such a shift occurred; the advent of
surcharging seems to be associated with increased ATM availability to consumers.4
In general, it is difficult to empirically estimate the effects of incompatibility. Beyond the classic
problems involved in inferring welfare changes, there are unique problems associated with estimat-
ing welfare effects of incompatibility in network markets. Very few markets display variation in
compatibility over time, meaning that data regarding changes in compatibility are scarce. More-
over, because network effects operate through multiple components of a system, a complete welfare
analysis requires data on prices and characteristics for each component of the network.
Our data are well-suited for such an analysis. We conduct our empirical work using a data
set containing ATM-related characteristics for banks operating in different local markets through-
out the United States. Our data cover the period 1994-1999, containing roughly ten thousand
bank/county/year observations. Each observation contains information regarding the bank’s ATMs
and ATM fees, as well as the number of competitors’ ATMs available to customers and their fees.
It also contains information regarding deposit account (ATM card) prices and market shares, as
well as characteristics associated with these accounts. Thus, we possess panel data on prices,
quantities and characteristics for both components of the network good, as well as a measure of
incompatibility.
The empirical approach involves estimating a structural model of consumer demand for deposit
accounts (ATM cards) as a function of deposit account prices, ATM density and other bank char-
acteristics. The model allows us to estimate consumers’ willingness to pay for deposit accounts,
and the influence of ATMs on willingness to pay. It also allows us to estimate the indirect network
effect: the relationship between willingness to pay for an account and competitors’ ATM fleet size.
Finally, we estimate the relationship between competitors’ surcharges and willingness to pay for
competitors’ ATMs; this captures the effect of incompatibility.
The estimated parameters from this model provide the basis for our welfare analysis. The first
component of the welfare effect is the partial equilibrium reduction in consumer welfare resulting
from the shift toward incompatibility. We also provide a fuller estimate that incorporates changes
in ATM deployment–both for a given bank’s own ATMs and its competitors’ ATMs. Our results
suggest that incompatibility ceteris paribus harms consumers during our sample. Surcharging
4Incompatibility may also change the intensity of price competition. While we plan to address this issue in future
work, our current study focuses solely on demand-side effects.
4significantly reduces the indirect network effect conferred by competitors’ ATMs; the parameter
estimates imply that consumer welfare is ten percent lower under surcharging. However, ATM
deployment increases following surcharging, providing benefits to customers that in some cases
completely offset the reduction in welfare associated with incompatibility. Roughly stated, the net
effects on welfare are more likely to be positive in urban areas, and more likely to be negative in
rural areas.
We also estimate split sample specifications that allow the demand parameters to vary by local
market population density. We find that the network effects associated with ATMs and cards are
much stronger in areas with high population density. This is consistent with the idea that in areas
with high travel costs, ATM access is more valuable to consumers. Using the parameters from the
split samples, we find that welfare changes in low density markets are essentially zero, while welfare
changes in high-density areas average roughly fourteen percent.
To our knowledge, ours is the first empirical study to examine changes in incompatibility and
product attributes in a market characterized by indirect network effects.5 To date, most research
has examined the value of compatibility across different products in markets with direct network
effects.6 It also has focused on instances where compatibility between products remains fixed over
time, relying on cross-sectional variation in compatibility for identification.7 Our work does relate
to a developing literature establishing empirical relationships in markets with indirect network
effects, but this work examines markets in which compatibility between different systems is fixed.8
It also complements existing literature examining ATM markets, although that literature does not
focus on incompatibility per se.9
5An exception is Greenstein (1994), who finds that mainframe buyers prefer to upgrade to compatible systems, a
result suggesting that compatibility between past and future hardware is important.
6Gandal (1994, 1995) and Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) find that computer spreadsheets compatible with the
Lotus system commanded higher prices during the early 1990s.
7The analyses in Gandal (1994, 1995) and Brynjolfsson and Kemerer (1996) do not separate within-firm from
cross-sectional effects of compatibility. The datasets are panels, but too small to allow the examination of within-firm
variation.
8Gandal, Greenstein and Salant (1999) study the link between operating system values and software availability
in the early days of the microcomputer market. They find evidence supporting the existence of complementary
feedback between hardware and software availability. More recent work by Gandal, Kende and Rob (2002) seeks
to establish a positive feedback link between adoption of Compact Disks (CDs) and CD players. Rysman (2000)
provides evidence supporting the existence of complementary demand relationships in a two-sided platform market
(yellow page directories). More recent work by Shankar and Bayus (2002), Nair, Chintagunta and Dube (2003) and
Ohashi (2003) also applies structural econometric techniques to test for the existence of network effects.
9Hannan et al. (2003) examine surcharging although they do link surcharging to deposit account pricing. Prager
52 ATMs, ATM Cards and ATM Fees
ATMs allow bank customers to perform financial transactions electronically. ATMs initially served
banks’ desires to cut costs by automating tasks performed by bank tellers. While ATMs can in
principle perform more complex transactions such as deposits or loan payments, the most common
transaction is a cash withdrawal.10 Banks locate or deploy ATMs both “on-premise” at branches,
and “off-premise” at other locations likely to generate significant transaction volume.11 Independent
Service Operators (ISOs) also deploy ATMs, typically in lower-volume locations such as convenience
stores, restaurants and bars.12
Banks grant consumers access to their ATMs by providing ATM cards with checking (demand
deposit) accounts. The deposit account also carries other services, such as check-writing and
direct deposit for paychecks. Banks are differentiated both horizontally through geography, and
vertically through service quality. Survey evidence suggests that the most important account
features in determining customer attraction and retention are service quality and ATM/branch
location.13 Customers also may value purchasing other financial services such as loans or brokerage
services from their depository institution; the breadth of these offerings is therefore a source of
both horizontal and vertical differentiation.
Customers pay both implicit and explicit prices on deposit accounts. The implicit cost is the
opportunity cost of holding cash in a non-interest bearing account, or earning an interest rate
below the risk-free rate if the checking account pays interest. Explicit costs may include a monthly
service charge, fees associated with transactions (such as check-writing), and penalty fees such as
(2001) tests whether small banks lost market share in states that allowed surcharges prior to 1996; this is implicitly a
test of whether incompatibility favored banks with high-quality ATM fleets, although she does not pose the question
in those terms. Hannan and McDowell (1990) find that markets in which large banks adopted ATMs became more
concentrated during the 1980s, although they do not discuss their finding in terms of network economics. Saloner and
Shepard (1995) examine the diffusion of ATM machines from 1972-1979 and find that adoption occurred earliest for
firms with many branches and deposits, a result they interpret as consistent with the existence of indirect network
effects in demand. Earlier work by Hannan and McDowell (1984a, 1984b) also examines the causes of ATM adoption
but does not test for network effects.
10Dove Consulting (1999, 2002) finds that in both 1999 and 2002, roughly eighty percent of ATM transactions were
cash withdrawals. Deposits and inquiries comprise roughly ten percent each.
11Monthly costs of ATMs average over $1000 for high-end machines, and may be as low as $500 for low-end machines
offering fewer features and using cheaper telecommunications. Rental expenses for off-premise ATM deployment may
add $200/month to this figure.
12See Dove Consulting (1999, 2002) for more details.
13See Stavins (1999) and Kiser (2003) for discussions of account characteristics valued by banking customers.
6NSF (insufficient funds) fees. Banks often offer customers a menu of options, trading lower explicit
fees or interest payments for higher minimum balances. The menus are usually determined at the
bank level, and identical across all branches for that bank.14 While total account costs for any
one customer may vary in principle depending on their pricing plan and balances, available survey
evidence suggests that these costs are similar for accounts with or without minimum balances,
averaging roughly $144 per year.15
Consumers typically pay no per-transaction fees for ATM transactions made at their own bank’s
machines. They can also use other banks’ ATMs to make foreign transactions, because during the
1980s most banks joined “shared networks” that allow consumers to use their card at any ATM
owned by a bank in the network. These ATM networks, which are often joint ventures organized by
member banks, provide switching services for each foreign transaction made on a member bank’s
ATM by another member bank’s customer. The networks jointly establish a fixed subscription fee
for each member bank in the network, a per-transaction switch fee paid by the cardholder’s bank
to the network, and a per-transaction interchange fee paid by the cardholder’s bank to the ATM
owner.16 By the mid-1990s, shared networks had expanded to the point that an ATM card would
function at nearly any ATM in the country.17
A foreign transaction may generate a foreign fee paid to the consumer’s home bank, and a sur-
charge paid to the owner of the ATM. Foreign fees exist throughout our sample and remain roughly
constant, while surcharges are a more recent phenomenon. Prior to 1996, the major ATM networks
(PLUS and Cirrus) prohibited banks from imposing surcharges. The major networks ostensibly
prohibited surcharging in an attempt to build consumer acceptance of foreign transactions. The
prohibition on surcharging was challenged by both banks and state legislatures; banks claimed that
surcharging would enable them to deploy ATMs in lower-volume locations, while states viewed the
ban as a potentially illegal vertical restraint. Prior to 1996, sixteen states overrode the surcharge
bans. Furthermore, antitrust actions regarding the surcharge ban were being considered by the
14Radecki (1998) provides evidence in favor of this point.
15See Stavins (1999) for details.
16Data from the Card Industry Directory show that network subscription fees vary substantially, with larger national
networks charging higher fees (as much as $25,000 for membership and $500 monthly). Interchange fees range from
$0.30-$0.60 per transaction during our sample, and switch fees range from $0.02-$0.12. Many networks apply some
sort of volume discount to their pricing.
17Currently it is most common for a bank to subscribe to one of the major national networks, and one or two
regional networks (which have priority in switching transactions relative to the national networks). It is also quite
common for banks to subscribe to the VISA or MasterCard networks, allowing their customers to use their ATM
cards to perform signature-based “offline” debit transactions on those networks.
7Department of Justice. Facing this pressure, the leading networks eliminated the ban. From 1997-
1999, most banks adopted surcharges, and they are currently nearly universal. Both foreign fees
and surcharges are set at the bank level; it is uncommon for a bank to set different fees on different
machines.18 It is also uncommon for banks to charge different fees in different local markets.
Table 1 shows summary statistics regarding ATM fees, deployment and transaction volume
during our sample period 1994-1999. The data illustrate that while foreign fees remain roughly
constant throughout our sample period, surcharging becomes much more prevalent after its incep-
tion in 1996.19 Concurrent with the advent of surcharging is an increase in ATM deployment; the
average annual growth rate is under fourteen percent from 1993-1996, and nearly eighteen percent
after 1996. Transaction volume holds steady after the advent of surcharging, after growing rapidly
prior to 1996. This leads to fewer transactions per ATM, a pattern consistent with the notion
that the break-even number of transactions per ATM is much lower if foreign transactions generate
surcharge revenue.20
2.1 The Network Economics of ATMs and ATM Cards
In the language of the literature on network economics, ATM cards and machines are a “hard-
ware/software” system.21 Consumers purchase “hardware” in the form of an ATM card by choosing
a bank and establishing an account. ATMs are “software” that allow consumers to assemble a com-
posite good–a financial transaction that is usually a cash withdrawal. This “mix and match” con-
struction of goods is a common feature of emerging technologies, and is analogous to that involved
in consumers’ matching of computer hardware and software, operating systems and spreadsheets,
different components of audio/visual systems, and a variety of other products. In ATM markets,
18Our data from the Card Industry Directory allow banks to list a range of fees. Fewer than ten percent do
so. Additionally the Bank Rate Monitor web site, www.bankrate.com, lists ATM fees by geographical region for
multi-region banks. There is little evidence from this source that banks charge different fees on ATMs in different
locations.
19These data show that some banks imposed surcharges in 1996; these banks either operated in states that overrode
the surcharge ban, or subscribed to smaller networks that did not adhere to the ban. Unfortunately, we do not possess
data in our primary sample on surcharging prior to 1997.
20This difference is dramatic. A study by Dove Consulting estimates the monthly accounting costs of maintaining
an ATM at roughly $1200. If interchange ($0.40 per transaction) is the only source of ATM revenue, the break-even
number of foreign transactions per month is 3000. If interchange plus surcharging yields revenue of $1.90 per foreign
transaction, the break-even monthly number of foreign transactions falls to 631.
21See Katz and Shapiro (1994) for a survey of this literature. Economides and Salop (1992) present a theoretical
model of hardware/software competition using ATMs as an example.
8as in many of the aforementioned examples, firms produce both hardware and software, and offer
their customers bundles containing both. Thus, a customer establishing an account receives both
an ATM card and free access to that bank’s ATMs. This suggests that for the purpose of under-
standing ATM markets, the most relevant models of competition in hardware/software markets
are those in which integrated firms sell both hardware and software.22 Our focus in this paper
is on estimating consumer welfare. We therefore are concerned primarily with the implications of
network effects for consumers’ willingness to pay for components of the system–which in our case
is the hardware/software bundle offered by banks. Our discussion takes firms’ strategic behavior
regarding pricing, incompatibility and quality as given, and focuses on the effects of changes in these
factors on consumers. This parallels our empirical approach, which uses variation in incompatibility
to estimate changes in consumer welfare.
We would expect a consumer’s willingness to pay for an account and associated ATM services
to depend on the characteristics of the account–service quality, for example, as well as any comple-
mentary services offered with the account. One (internalized) indirect network effect in the bundle
is that willingness to pay should also depend on the bank’s own ATMs. Consumer incur travel
costs to use ATMs; therefore, a greater number of local ATMs reduces travel costs and makes an
account more attractive. It also means that if consumers value accounts based on which bank has
the ATMs closest to “home,” more consumers will be closer to an ATM of that bank. The second
indirect network effect on willingness to pay is that competitors’ ATMs also provide benefits, be-
cause ATMs operate on shared networks. While consumers may prefer to use an ATM operated
by their own bank (even absent fees, they can perform a wider array of transactions on their own
ATMs), they also should value occasional access to other banks’ ATMs.
2.2 ATM Fees as Incompatibility
In hardware/software markets, the compatibility issue revolves around whether Firm A’s hardware
will function with Firm B’s software, and vice versa. The most general result of these models is
that incompatibility reduces consumers’ willingness to pay, ceteris paribus. The strength of this
effect depends on the degree to which consumers want to mix and match hardware and software
from different sellers. If demand for such transactions is zero, incompatibility leaves consumers
22Chou and Shy (1990), Church and Gandal (1996), and Matutes and Regibeau (1988) consider cases where
hardware and software are sold by integrated firms. Economides and Salop (1992) provide a comparison of market
structures characterized by different forms of integration and ownership among component (hardware and software)
producers. Matutes and Regibeau (1992) examine a case where firms produce both hardware and software, and may
bundle them together.
9unaffected, but if demand for mix and match transactions is high, incompatibility reduces aggregate
willingness to pay. These effects may vary by firm; firms with high demand for mix and match
transactions will experience a larger reduction in willingness to pay.
ATM surcharges create incompatibility by increasing the cost of access to other banks’ ATMs.
While surcharges do not render competitors’ ATMs fully incompatible, they impose an incremental
expense for foreign ATM use. In the language of network economics, this expense is most analogous
to an “adaptor fee” paid by software users to achieve compatibility with potentially incompatible
hardware.23 This effect should weaken the relationship between willingness to pay for an ATM
card (account) and the number of accessible competitors’ ATMs.
2.3 Incompatibility and ATM Deployment
Ceteris paribus, we would expect incompatibility to leave consumers worse off, but this is a partial
equilibrium result. Anecdotally, it appears that ATM deployment accelerated after 1996; using
the data from Table 1 reveals that within our sample, the annual growth rate of ATMs increased
from roughly fourteen percent to over eighteen percent after 1996. A prominent explanation for
this shift is that incompatibility strengthened incentives to invest in product quality, because ATM
owners could extract rents associated with their ATM fleets. Another explanation for increased
ATM deployment is that firms attempted to leverage competitive advantage in ATM fleets into
the deposit account market.24 Within the context of network economics, one can interpret this
as analogous to attempts by firms to leverage market power in either hardware or software into
a complementary market; incentives for doing so are stronger under incompatibility.25 In ATM
markets, small banks have alleged that large banks use ATM fees as a device to attract market share.
High surcharges, the argument goes, induce customers with high demand for foreign transactions
to migrate their accounts from banks with small ATM fleets to banks with large ATM fleets.
In order to fully assess the welfare effects of incompatibility, then, we need to estimate not
only the reduction in utility stemming directly from incompatibility, but also any changes in ATM
deployment associated with the shift toward incompatibility. From a theoretical perspective it is not
clear which effect will dominate. Much of the existing literature on incompatibility does not model
23See Farrell and Saloner (1992) for a model of adaptors in a hardware/software market.
24These incentives are the primary focus of the theoretical models of ATM pricing and deployment in Massoud and
Bernhardt (2002a, 2002b).
25See Church and Gandal (1996, 2000) and Carlton and Waldman (2002) for analyses of incompatibility, leveraging
and foreclosure in system markets.
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firms’ decisions regarding product quality or characteristics.26 A further complication, and one that
we do not fully model, is that incompatibility may change the intensity of competition. Here again
theory is ambiguous; models of competition in mix and match markets find that incompatibility may
either intensify or weaken price competition.27 Despite this theoretical ambiguity, our intuition tells
us that in ATM markets the advent of surcharging would probably weaken price competition.28
Without ATM fees of any sort, ATM fleet size is not a source of horizontal or vertical product
differentiation. As fees rise, the degree of differentiation also rises, which we would expect to
weaken business-stealing opportunities. Our empirical work below should control for such shifts in
competitive behavior, although we can not identify the size of their effects.
3 Modeling
In order to measure the effects of incompatibility on consumer welfare, we estimate a structural
demand system for deposit account services and ATM usage. This follows techniques developed
by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), building on Lancaster (1966). The essence of the empirical
approach is to estimate the relationship between consumer utility and product characteristics;
specific products are modeled as bundles of characteristics. Under specific assumptions regarding
the functional form of preferences on observed and unobserved characteristics, there is a structural
relationship between aggregate firm-level market shares and the parameters of consumers’ indirect
utility functions. This approach is more parsimonious than traditional demand system estimation,
as it reduces the large matrix of own- and cross-price elasticities to a smaller matrix of coefficients
associated with product characteristics.
3.1 Consumer Behavior
In our econometric framework, the fundamental consumer choice is the establishment of a demand
deposit (checking) account relationship with a bank. Consumers choose from the set of banks
26Classic papers on “mix and match” competition such as Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989)
assume that product characteristics are fixed. Einhorn (1992) models the effect of quality differences across component
producers, but assumes that such differences are exogenous.
27The discussion in Katz and Shapiro (1994) mentions instances in which compatibility might intensify price
competition. Matutes and Regibeau (1988), Economides (1989) and Einhorn (1992) all find that compatibility
relaxes price competition. Katz and Shapiro (1986) find that in a dynamic setting, compatibility has different effects
on competition at different points in the product life cycle.
28We find evidence consistent with this view in Knittel and Stango (2003).
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within their county in order to maximize indirect utility.29 Consumer i’s utility for bank j in
county k in year t is a function of the price for a deposit account pjt, bank j’s observable deposit
account characteristics xjkt in county k in year t, the access to ATMs Njkt provided by obtaining
an account, the bank’s unobservable characteristics ξj , county level unobservable characteristics
ξk, bank/county unobservable characteristics ξjk, unobservable year-specific characteristics ξt and
a mean zero term ijkt capturing unobserved consumer heterogeneity.30 This yields the following
specification:
uikjt = αipjt + xjktβi +Njkt + ξjk + ξt + ikjt (1)
While in practice the vector of marginal utility coefficients (αi, βi) varies by consumer, in this
instance we restrict the coefficients to be constant across consumers. By omitting income from
the utility function, we are assuming that there are negligible income effects when establishing a
deposit account. Given the low share of consumer income devoted to purchasing checking account
services, we feel this is reasonable. The assumption is also a function of our data, which do not
lend themselves to such an analysis.31
3.2 Deriving the Estimating Equation
As shown by Berry (1994), if ikjt follows an extreme value distribution one can integrate the
individual utilities to obtain an estimating equation that provides a structural relationship between
the utility parameters and market shares for each firm. This yields the following equation:
ln (sjkt) = αpjt + xjktβ +Njkt + ξjk + ξt +∆ξjkt (2)
This is a useful transformation in our case, because while we do not observe individual consumer
choices, we do possess bank/county/year observations on market share, prices and other explanatory
29Using counties to approximate local markets is common in the banking literature. Some recent work (e.g., Radecki
[1998]) argues that geographic banking markets have expanded. However, we feel that while this may be true for
products such as loans, it is much less likely to be true for ATM-related services. In fact, we use the county as the
market even in MSAs, rather than treating the MSA as the market. In practice this has no effect on our results.
30While in principle there are separate bank effects ξj , county effects ξk and bank/county effects ξjk, in practice
we nest them within ξjk.
31Our data are measured at the bank/county/year level, but income data are only available at the state/year level.
The BEA publishes county/year income figures, but these are interpolated between decennial Census figures rather
than actually observed.
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variables of interest. Note that the consumer-specific heterogeneity has been “integrated out” here,
and replaced by the bank/county/year specific term ∆ξjkt capturing unobserved quality.
While econometrically tractable, the specification of utility that leads to this estimating equation
is quite restrictive.32 A significant limitation is that a proportional increase in all bank prices will
not reduce demand for banking services. A common way to guarantee that banks lose market
share when prices rise involves choosing an “outside good” to which consumers can switch given an
increase in prices by all banks. In our case, we not only observe deposits for banks in each county,
but also observe deposits for credit unions; these institutions are imperfect substitutes for banks
and are the product to which consumers might conceivably switch given higher bank prices.33 We
therefore treat banks as the “inside good” and credit unions as the outside good.
Another way of enriching the model is to assume that consumers make a two-stage decision,
in which they first decide whether to establish an account at a credit union or at a bank. Given
that choice, they make their second stage decision regarding with which institution to establish
an account. This allows for more intuitive substitution patterns, in which a consumer switching
away from a bank is more likely to switch to another bank than to a credit union. In a manner
similar to that outlined above, one can begin with a general specification in which consumers
have heterogeneous preferences for remaining in each “nest.” These are also integrated out under
specific assumptions regarding the form of the heterogeneity. As Berry (1994) shows, this leads to
the following nested logit estimating equation:
ln (sjkt)− ln (sokt) = αpjt + xjktβ +Njkt + σt ln
³
s¯j|g
´
+ ξjk + ξt +∆ξjkt (3)
The term sokt is the market share of the outside good, while s¯j|g is bank j’s share of the inside
good. The term σt represents the correlation between consumer choices within each nest; higher
values of σt reflect a higher likelihood that a consumer switching away from one bank will choose
another bank rather than a credit union. Letting the term vary by year allows the substitutability
between the inside and outside goods to change over time.
32See Nevo (2000) for a discussion of these issues, and some improvements to the model we use here.
33To be more precise, we treat banks and thrift institutions as the inside good. We have also estimated the model
treating banks as the inside good, and thrifts/credit unions as the outside good. This has little effect on the results.
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3.3 Measuring Market Share
We use data from the FDIC Summary of Deposits database to obtain the total deposits held by each
bank in each county of operation during our sample period.34 Similar data from the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA) yield deposit data for credit unions, which we use to calculate the
share of the outside good.35 In our sample, the share of deposits held by the inside good falls slightly
over time as credit unions gain market share. Anecdotally, it also appears that the substitutability
of credit unions and banks grows during our sample as well, because credit unions have expanded
their service offerings to more closely match those of banks.
One issue associated with our dependent variable is that it is based on total deposits held by
each bank. Total deposits include not only checking (deposit) account balances, but also savings
and other time deposits such as money markets and CDs. Thus, this total market share may
measure checking deposit market share with error. In principle, this can present a problem in our
framework, even if the measurement error is of a form that is innocuous in more standard linear
regressions.36 In practice, however, there is little evidence that this error is significant.37
3.4 Deposit Account Prices
We take pricing data on deposit accounts from the FDIC Reports of Condition and Income, or Call
Reports. These data are available at the card issuer (bank) level. The variable listed in the Call
Reports shows annual income from fees associated with deposit accounts. The primary component
of such revenue is income from monthly service charges on transaction accounts.38 It also includes
foreign fee income paid by its customers stemming from the use of other issuers’ ATMs, and a
variety of other fees such as NSF fees for bounced checks and other penalty fees on accounts. To
calculate a normalized price for each bank, we divide this value by the end-of-year dollar value of
34The SOD also contains deposit data for thrifts. While we use thrift deposit data in calculating market shares,
we can not include observations for thrifts in our sample because we do not possess prices or other data for them.
35The mean outside good share is roughly twelve percent in our sample; the interquartile range is [0.01, 0.16].
36See Berry (1994) for a discussion.
37At the bank level, the correlation between total deposits and demand deposits is 0.98.
38This variable also includes income on other types of deposit accounts that do not carry ATM card access,
introducing measurement error. However, these other types of accounts (such as savings) typically have lower fees
than checking accounts. We examine within-bank variation in these fees, meaning that our results below will only be
biased if within-bank variation in other fees is correlated with our variables of interest (e.g., ATMs). Most importantly,
we use an instrumental variable approach that controls for the measurement error in price, as well as the endogeneity
of price.
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deposits held in transaction accounts.39 This price measure therefore represents the average revenue
per dollar (per year) of transaction account balances. While it undoubtedly averages over the many
different fees and fee schedules offered by each bank, this price measure is highly correlated with
annual price measures using finer data.40
This measure omits the additional opportunity cost of holding deposits in checking. While this
opportunity cost surely varies across customers, Radecki (1999) suggests using the federal funds
rate as an approximation of forgone interest income for demand deposit balances. We therefore
add the average annual fed funds rate to each bank’s price.41 While this does not affect any of our
coefficient estimates because they rely on within-bank variation in prices over time, it does provide
a useful benchmark for comparing our price measure to others. As a point of comparison, we find
that our raw price measure averages roughly $0.01 per dollar of transaction balances, while the
cost of funds averages roughly $0.05. The typical checking account has average balances of $1600,
implying an annual cost of $96. This figure is in line with other estimates in the banking literature.
The discussion above should make clear that our price variable is subject to measurement error.
However, if this measurement error is fairly constant over time it is not an issue because we use
within-bank variation to estimate the model.42 Additionally, our instrumental variable procedure
outlined below should account for measurement error that varies over time. Finally, in other work
we estimate a series of hedonic relationships between account prices and characteristics using a
wide variety of price measures (such as revenue per account rather than per dollar of balances),
and also controlling for bank-level balances per account and other possible influences on measured
39We have also used an alternative measure that divides deposit fee income by the dollar value of deposits. This is
the variable used by Dick (2002) in her study of consumer welfare in deposit markets. Our results using this measure
are nearly identical to those shown below.
40Stavins (1999) regresses the fee variable used in our price on actual fee data from surveys (such as minimum
balance requirements, monthly fees etc.) and finds that the explanatory variables explain over eighty percent of the
variation in fee income.
41We would expect there to be considerable consumer-level heterogeneity in the opportunity cost of funds. Con-
sumers carrying credit card balances, for example, would have high costs. This might affect the bank-level cost of
funds if consumers are not uniformly allocated across banks. However, our instruments (in particular those measuring
the riskiness of a bank’s customer base) should capture at least some of this variation.
42Large banks tend to pay lower interest than smaller banks. This may refect quality differences or market power.
If savings rate differences stem from market power and consumers face switching costs, we will slightly overstate the
price difference between large and small banks using our fee income variable.
Another issue to consider the sorting of different customer types (e.g., those with high and low balances per account)
across different banks. More importantly, it does not allow changes in such sorting after the advent of surcharges.
While such a shift is certainly possible, we have found no evidence that it occurred; we have examined movements in
customer base data such as balances per account following 1996, and found no significant changes.
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prices.43 There is little difference in the empirical results using these different measures.
3.5 Specifying the Benefits of ATMs
The access to ATMs associated with an account Njkt will depend on bank j’s ATM deployment in
the local market. It will also depend on the network effects conferred by other banks’ ATMs, and
the compatibility of those other ATMs. We model this access using the following specification:
Njkt = b1 ln(OwnATMsjkt) + [b2 + b3E (s−j,kt)] ln(CompetATMsjkt) (4)
The first term b1 measures the value of bank j’s ATMs in the local market.44 We measure the
ATM variable in logs to capture the declining marginal value of ATMs; the incremental effect of
an additional ATM falls with more ATMs in the market, growing negligible as the market becomes
saturated.
The second term estimates the value of the indirect network effect associated with the presence
of competitors’ ATMs. This value is represented by the term [b2 + b3E (s−j,kt)], where b2 repre-
sents the value of a competitors’ ATM with full compatibility (zero surcharges), and b3 represents
the reduction in value from competitors’ ATMs caused by surcharges. This gives the following
specification:
ln (sjkt)− ln (sokt) = αpjt + xjktβ + b1 ln(OwnATMsjkt) (5)
+ [b2 + b3E (s−j,kt)] ln(CompetATMsjkt)
+σt ln
³
s¯j|g
´
+ ξjk + ξt +∆ξjkt
One methodological issue associated with this specification is that it includes the impact of
foreign fees only in the price term pjt. While in one sense foreign fees are a part of the consumer’s
expected costs associated with an account, it is also true that foreign fees create incompatibil-
ity. While we can not separate the share of pjt driven by foreign fee revenue, we do estimate
specifications that allow a bank’s foreign fees fjt to affect the value of competitors’ ATMs:
ln (sjkt)− ln (sokt) = αpjt + xjktβ + b1 ln(OwnATMsjkt) (6)
43See Knittel and Stango (2004) for details.
44One might imagine that a density measure such as ln(ATMs per square mile) might be appropriate. Our definition
is equivalent with fixed county effects and our log specification, because the square mileage of counties does not change
over time.
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+ [b2 + b3 (fjt +E (s−j,kt))] ln(CompetATMsjkt)
+σt ln
³
s¯j|g
´
+ ξjk + ξt +∆ξjkt
Another issue is that while we only observe surcharges in 1997 and beyond, some banks did
begin to surcharge prior to that point because they operated in a state that had overridden the
ban. We do know which states overrode the ban, allowing us to estimate a specification using a
simple dummy variable to measure the transition to surcharging:
ln (sjkt)− ln (sokt) = αpjt + xjktβ + b1 ln(OwnATMsjkt) (7)
+ [b2 + b3 (fjt +E (s−j,kt)) + b4I (k ∈ St & t < 1996)] ln(CompetATMsjkt)
+σt ln
³
s¯j|g
´
+ ξjk + ξt +∆ξjkt
where St is the set of state that overrode the surcharge bank. Thus, b4 represents the reduction in
the indirect network effect associated with competitors’ ATMs in the states that overrode the ban
prior to 1996, while b3 measures the effect of incompatibility after 1996. In the main results section
below, we report estimates from equation (7). We also report results using the other measures
of incompatibility in appendix Table A3; the results are qualitatively very similar, although the
coefficient on incompatibility is estimated more precisely in our preferred specification.
3.6 ATM-Related Data and Measurement Issues
While we possess data on market shares and deposits for the population of banks, we only observe
data on ATM fees and deployment for the 300 largest ATM card issuers. While these issuers
collectively hold a large share of the total market (for cards or machines), we do not observe such
data for smaller issuers. The primary effect of this limitation is to reduce our useable sample size,
as we only include in our estimating sample those observations for which we observe both ATM
fees and ATM deployment.
Another issue with our ATM data is that while we observe each issuer’s total ATM deployment,
we do not observe the allocation of that deployment across counties. This is not a problem for single-
county issuers, which represent twenty-five percent of our observations. For the other issuers, we
assume that banks allocate ATMs across counties in proportion to their branches (which we observe
without error from the Summary of Deposits). That is, we use:
OwnATMs∗jkt =
Branchjkt
Branchjt
OwnATMsjt (8)
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This introduces error into our measure of OwnATMsjkt. To the extent that the measurement
error is constant for a particular bank/county over time, our fixed effects will control for it. How-
ever, it is possible that there is time-varying bank/county measurement error. As is well-known,
measurement error in an independent variable leads to attenuation bias, bringing the absolute value
of the estimated coefficients closer to zero.45 A number of methods for correcting attenuation bias
exist.46 Below we discuss our method and some robustness checks of that method.
Competitors’ ATMs also are measured with error, because we do not observe ATM deployment
for every bank in each county.47 We rely on the information we do have regarding competitors’
branches to estimate competitors’ ATMs, using a regression-based method. We have experimented
with several estimation methods, all of which yield similar results, in part because the ATM de-
ployment of smaller issuers is fairly easy to predict; almost all smaller issuers deploy roughly one
ATM per branch, with deployment growing slightly over time.48 In the results shown here, we
use a regression-based imputation method that uses data from our observed issuers to fit ATM
deployment for other issuers in local markets.49
We also face measurement error in constructing a measure of competitors’ ATM fees. We
use a regression-based method for imputing expected competitors’ surcharges.50 Again, we have
experimented with alternative methods of estimating competitors’ fees, with little effect on the
45This result pertains to the univariate case. In a multivariate setting, correlation among (mismeasured) X’s can
lead measurement error bias to be toward or away from zero.
46See Fuller (1987) for an exposition of the problem and comprehensive treatment of the literature up to that point.
One line of research proposes techniques when the “reliability ratio” or some other independently available index of
the degree of error is available; see Fuller (1987) for examples and solutions. In the absence of such information,
Griliches and Hausman (1986) and Biorn (2002) propose instrumental variable techniques appropriate for use with
panel data, although their techniques involve differencing which would substantially reduce our sample size. Lewbel
(1997) and Dagenais and Dagenais (1997) suggests using higher moments of the observed variables as instruments;
we discuss and apply this technique below.
47On average, the banks for which we observe ATM-related data collectively hold forty-seven percent of deposits
in the county. Their share of ATMs in that county is almost surely higher.
48For more detail on differences between large and small issuers, see Knittel and Stango (2003)
49In order to estimate the number of ATMs deployed by other institutions, we estimate a within-sample regression
of ATMs on branches, year dummies and year/branch interaction terms. To control for the fact that larger institutions
have a greater ratio of ATMs to branches, we allow issuer size (in deposits) to affect branches per ATM. We also
allow branches per ATM to vary based on whether the issuer is located in an MSA or non-MSA county. We then
construct fitted values of ATMs for each institution for which we do not have ATM data. We have experimented
with a number of alternative specifications of this model, with essentially no change in the results.
50We first estimate the within-sample probability of surcharging and surcharge level (conditional on surcharging)
based on issuer size, year effects, MSA dummies and interactions between these variables. We then predict the
expected surcharge (probability of surcharging multipled by expected surcharge) for each competing bank. The
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results. The shift to surcharging is fairly discrete, meaning that small differences in a prediction
of competitors’ surcharges are swamped by the change occurring between 1996 and 1998. In fact,
using a simple dummy variable indicating whether competitors can impose surcharges yields results
very similar to those shown below.
We are left with three independent variables that may be measured with error, meaning that
our estimating equation is:
ln (sjkt)− ln (sokt) = αpjt + xjktβ + b1 ln(OwnATMs∗jkt) (9)
+
h
b2 + b3
³
fjt +E
³
s∗−j,kt
´´
+ b4I (k ∈ St & t < 1996)
i
ln(CompetATMs∗jkt)
+σt ln
³
s¯j|g
´
+ ξjk + ξt +∆ξjkt
We address the measurement error issue by implementing the procedure in Lewbel (1997).
This involves using higher moments of the observable data (both the proxies and the xjkt’s) as
instruments for the variables that are measured with error.51 In the results below, we present both
estimates that use this EIV-IV (Error-in-Variables Instrumental Variable) correction and estimates
that do not, and discuss their differences. We also conduct some robustness checks using different
imputation methods and split samples, which we discuss in the “alternative specification” section
below and present in the Appendices.
The specification above omits two variables. First, it does not include data regarding the
availability of point-of-sale (POS) terminals. These terminals allow consumers to use their debit
(ATM) card to make purchases at retail locations such as supermarkets. Their availability has
countervailing influences in our specification. First, the availability of POS terminals would cer-
tainly increase consumers’ willingness to pay for debit cards. On the other hand, POS terminals
are a substitute for ATMs because they offer consumers an alternative means of payment. the key
question then becomes whether ATM deployment is correlated in our sample with POS terminal
availability. While we do not possess disaggregate POS terminal data, aggregate evidence suggests
that this is the case. The volume of POS transactions and the availability of POS terminal both
accelerated after 1996, suggesting that consumer demand for POS transactions increased following
expected competitors’ surcharge is an average of these and observed surcharges over all competitors in the local
market, weighted by each competitors’ share of branches in the local market.
51These instruments will provide consistent estimates of the true parameters if the joint distribution of the variables
measured with error is not multivariate normal–in particular, if the distribution is skewed.
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the advent of surcharging.52 The effect of this growth would be to increase our estimates of the
value of ATMs and competitors’ ATMs. On the other hand, it would reduce our estimates of the
effects of incompatibility.
While we do not possess data on POS availability, we do observe POS transactions per card
for our set of issuers. In unreported results, we have estimated models that include the level of
POs transactions per card, as well as interaction terms between POS usage and the ATM-related
variables. The results are not statistically significant. Moreover, including the POS variables does
not affect the sign or significance of the ATM-related variables.
Another omitted variable is the growth in ATMs deployed by ISOs. Again, we possess no
regional data on deployment by these ATM owners. Aggregate data suggest, however, that between
1996 and 1999 the share of ATMs deployed by ISOs grew from nearly zero to roughly ten percent.
This implies that our estimates of post-1996 ATM growth are too low; this becomes an issue in
Section 5 when we estimate the relationship between surcharging and ATM deployment. We discuss
the implications of this when we present the empirical results.
3.6.1 Endogeneity
The unobserved portion of quality that remains in the error term, ∆ξjkt, is likely to be correlated
with the price variable pj and the within-nest market share s¯j|g. Increases in unobserved quality
will likely be correlated with both increases in price and within group share. We account for this
following Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) by using costs and competitors’
characteristics as instruments.53
3.7 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 lists yearly trends for the primary variables used in our analysis. In addition to the
variables discussed above, we also define a set of bank-level variables capturing other characteristics
52It is difficult to definitively attribute the change to surcharging because the advent of surcharging occurred during
a period of independently rapid growth for POS. Nonetheless, aggregate data from the EFT Network Data Book show
that the number of POS transactions increased at an annual rate of roughly 35 percent in the two years prior to
the end of the surcharge ban, and nearly eighty percent in the year following its elimination. Growth remained high
(greater than forty percent) for the next two years, before slowing again.
53Our cost measure is the bank’s average loan loss rate over the previous year. The competitors’ characteristics
include offerings of brokerage services and money market accounts, which will vary by bank/county/year. This
implicitly assumes that competitors’ characteristics are exogenous from any one bank’s perspective.
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associated with deposit accounts, for inclusion in the xjkt vector. These variables follow closely the
set used in other structural demand studies in banking.54 We use county-level branches to measure
convenience of access to non-ATM related services. We use employees per branch and salaries per
employee to capture service quality. We measure the number of counties in which a bank operates,
in order to allow willingness to pay to depend on the geographic breadth of a bank’s operations. The
average number of counties that a bank has branches in increases dramatically over the sample.
This is the result of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
that relaxed interstate branching restrictions. Finally, we define two dummy variables indicating
whether the bank offers complementary services: money market accounts, and brokerage services.
We would expect that increases in any of these variables would increase consumers’ willingness to
pay for accounts.
While we do not present the results here, in related work we examine our summary data in
more detail in order to highlight the variation in our data that drives identification.55 In that
work we observe two general trends. First, much of the within-firm increases in ATM density
(and competitors’ ATMs) appear to be accompanied by increased prices on deposit accounts. This
pattern is in fact suggested by the data in Table 2 as well. Furthermore, we observe that the greatest
changes in behavior occur for (a) large rather than small banks, and (b) urban rather than rural
banks. It appears that the post-1996 increase in ATM deployment, and any associated increase in
deposit prices are concentrated primarily among large urban banks. In fact, among small urban
banks ATM deployment stays essentially flat, while deposit prices actually fall. There is relatively
minor variation in foreign fees or competitors’ surcharges across these categories, although larger
banks are more likely to impose surcharges themselves (thereby increasing competitors’ surcharges
for all other banks in the market). Interestingly, during all of these changes within-firm market
shares are relatively stable, with the exception of small urban banks, who appear to lose some
ground relative to large urban banks.56
4 Results
Table 3 reports the results from four specifications estimating equation (7).57 The first specification
uses OLS and ignores the endogeneity of prices and within-nest market share. The second speci-
54Dick (2002) is the first work to employ these variables.
55See Knittel and Stango (2003) for details.
56Average market share falls in Table II above, but primarily due to sample composition.
57These results are nearly identical to those from the specifications in equations 5 and 6. This is not surprising;
most of the within-firm variation in fjt + E (s−j,kt) stems from variation in E (s−j,kt), as firms do not change their
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fication instruments for prices and within-nest market share. The third specification implements
the Error-in-Variables Instrumental Variable (EIV-IV) specification.
Patterns across the specifications seem sensible. The price coefficient grows more negative
when we move to the IV specifications. The coefficients on the variables measured with error
change significantly moving from the IV to EIV-IV specifications, and for the most part in an
intuitive way. We expect that the competitors’ ATMs and competitors’ surcharges variables are
measured with relatively more error than own ATMs; indeed, these coefficients change the most,
and the EIV-IV estimates are farther away from zero. This suggests that the technique reduces
attenuation bias.
Most of the coefficients on the xjkt follow an intuitive pattern. Utility for deposit accounts
increases with the number of branches, employees per branch, salary per employee and number
of counties in which a bank operates. The dummy variables indicating complementary service
offerings are not statistically significant, although in most specifications the coefficients are of the
expected signs.
The coefficient associated with price represents the marginal utility of income, and allows us
to interpret the other coefficients. It also allows us to calculate the firm-level price elasticity of
demand; we show summary data regarding these elasticity estimates in Table A4. The estimates
are generally quite low, lying near one for most banks. One possible explanation for this is the
significant anecdotal evidence that banks use checking account prices as loss leaders, in order to
engage in cross-marketing for loan and other financial service products. We plan to explore this
issue further in future work.
In order to clarify the economic interpretation of our results regarding the strength of network
effects, we discuss them here in terms of price changes that would leave consumers indifferent to
a given change in ATMs or incompatibility. Within this context we find that the indirect network
effect between a bank’s own ATM density and willingness to pay is strong; in exchange for a fifty
percent increase in own ATMs, the average consumer is willing to pay deposit account prices that
are roughly ten percent higher. The effect of competitors’ ATMs (absent fees) is also economically
significant; for a similar fifty percent increase in competitors’ ATMs the mean consumer would pay
deposit fees nearly twenty percent higher.58
foreign fees vey much. Similarly, most of the variation in E (s−j,kt) is fairly discrete and occurs in 1997 as firms
initially adopt surcharging.
58It may seem odd that an equal percentage increase in competitors’ ATMs would be worth more than in own
ATMs–but the base level of competitors’ ATMs is much higher, meaning that it is a significantly larger increase
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We also find significant effects of incompatibility. As the costs associated with using foreign
ATMs increase, the value associated with competitors’ ATMs falls. At the typical foreign cost of
$2.50, a proportional increase in competitors’ ATMs is worth three-quarters as much as when these
costs are zero. At a combined (foreign plus surcharge) cost of ten dollars, the typical customer de-
rives no value at all from competitors’ ATMs–meaning that this level of incompatibility eliminates
the indirect network effect.
5 Surcharging and Consumer Welfare
The policy debate surrounding ATM fees focuses on whether consumers have been adversely affected
by surcharging. Surcharging can affect consumer welfare in at least two ways. The first is the effect
of incompatibility in reducing the value of competitors’ ATMs. However, there is a second effect; it
appears that ATM deployment accelerated after 1996, which would increase consumer welfare. At-
tempting to quantify the net effect of these changes requires estimating changes in deployment after
1996; given that ATM deployment was growing even before 1996, we estimate the shift in the growth
rate after 1996 in order to avoid attributing all post-1996 deployment to surcharging. For each ATM
related variable
h
ln(OwnATMs∗jkt), ln(CompetATMs
∗
jkt), E
³
s∗−j,kt
´
ln(CompetATMs∗jkt), E
³
s∗−j,kt
´i
we estimate:
yjkt = α0 + α1t+ α2I (yr = 97) + α3I (yr = 98) + α4I (yr = 99) + εjkt (10)
We estimate three variations of equation (10). The first is a fixed effect regression at the bank/county
level. Under this specification, α4 represents the detrended average within bank/county growth rate
over the sample period. Table 4 reports these results. For OwnATMs∗jkt, the increase in the de-
trended increase in ATM deployment is 7 percent in 1999; for CompetATMs∗jkt the increase is 12
percent. The level of E
³
s∗−j,kt
´
ln(CompetATMs∗jkt) increases by 4.6.
In the second specification, we allow growth rates to vary by state by estimating equation (10)
for each state in our sample, pooling the bank/county observations. While this adds noise to our
detrended growth rates, it allows for state level variation in the growth rates. Finally, we estimate
equation (10) at the county level. The mean of the state- and county-level estimates is similar to
the aggregate measure reported in Table 4.
in the total number of ATMs. Given the parameter estimates, consumers are always willing to pay more for an
additional own rather than competitors’ machine.
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In Table 5, we use the parameters from Table 3 and our estimates of the increase in ATM
deployment to calculate the change in consumer welfare over the period 1994-1999. Because we
have estimates of the marginal utility associated with both ATMs and incompatibility, we can
use these parameters and estimates of changes in the ATM/incompatibility variables to calculate
utility changes for the typical consumer. We present aggregate, state-level and within-county
estimates. The aggregate estimates use the parameters from Table 5, and fix the changes in ATM-
related variables at their sample mean values. The within-state and within-county estimates use
the individual state- or county-level parameters, which we do not show to save space. We present
both dollar value and percentage figures. The dollar value numbers can be used to calculate actual
dollar costs to consumers from incompatibility. Recall that the typical consumer holds $1600 in
transaction balances over the year. Thus, finding that incompatibility reduced welfare by $0.0051
implies an annual cost of $8.16–or, roughly the cost of four foreign ATM transactions per year.
We provide both the partial effects of incompatibility holding ATM deployment constant, and
fuller estimates incorporating the welfare gains from increased deployment. On balance, the partial
effects amount to a reduction in consumer welfare equivalent to an increase in deposit fees of roughly
nine percent (or nine dollars per customer per year). Greater ATM deployment during our sample
period increases consumer welfare. However, an unweighted average across our observation still
shows the net effect on consumer welfare is a reduction equivalent to a 4-6% increase in deposit
fees.
To provide some evidence on cross-market differences, Figure 1 shows a kernel density estimate
of the percentage change in welfare from 1994 to 1999 for all counties in our sample. The figure
shows both the partial and full estimates. The full estimates vary widely because we estimate
significant variations across counties in the post-1996 shift in ATM deployment, and are positive
for a substantial share of counties. Some of this heterogeneity may simply reflect noise in our
estimates of county level changes. Nonetheless, it seems clear that there are some counties in which
ATM deployment expanded extremely rapidly, and perhaps rapidly enough that the gains from
increased deployment may have offset the effects of incompatibility. It further appears that many
of these areas are urban markets. Figure 2 plots our estimated county-level welfare changes against
the natural logarithm of county population density. The figure also includes a non-parametric
Lowess smoothed line. There appears to be a significant positive relationship between the two
and the non-parametric line is positive for population density levels above 400. A simple linear
regression confirms this, yielding the following estimated relationship:
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UtilChgPercentk = −0.329 + 0.056 ln(PopDensk) (11)
(0.028) (0.005)
While this estimate is admittedly rough, it predicts negative welfare effects for any county
with population density below 356 persons per square mile–a figure typical of such medium-sized
metropolitan areas as Kalamazoo county (Michigan) and Palm Beach county (Florida). Of the
roughly nine hundred counties in our sample, over six hundred fall below this level. Another way of
interpreting the results is that in a sparsely populated area such as Des Moines county (Iowa) with
a population density of roughly 100 people per square mile, the model implies a welfare change of
negative seven percent–while in a densely populated area such as Montgomery county (Maryland)
with 1500 people per square mile, the model implies a welfare change of positive seven percent.
The above results regarding population density depend solely on differences in ATM deployment
across markets, but it is also possible that demand parameters vary across markets. In particular,
it seems likely that areas with high population density have higher travel costs. This might increase
consumers’ willingness to pay for ATM services, since using ATMs involves traveling to them. To
analyze the effects of travel costs further, we estimate equation (7) separately for counties above
and below the median population density level. Lower travel costs should reduce the importance
of ATM density as well as reduce the surcharge level for which competitor’s ATMs are no longer
valued. The results for the ATM variables are reported in Table 6. In low population density
markets, the value placed on ATMs is much lower and not statistically significant, while the “break
even” foreign costs falls to under three dollars. In contrast, high density markets place a greater
weight on ATMs and competitors’ ATMs are valued even with very high foreign costs.59
Table 7 repeats the welfare calculation using these parameters, while Figure 3 plots these welfare
changes versus the log of population density for the base and split-sample models; the results are
striking. Consumers in high travel cost counties experience substantially higher welfare after 1996,
while the net effect remains negative for consumers in low travel cost counties. Figure 4 plots a
Lowess smoothed line through the welfare scatterplot (note the change in scale). Comparing this
to Figure 2 suggests that the welfare effect of surcharging becomes positive at a lower population
density and has a steeper slope than implied by the base model.60 While we repeat the caveat
59These are results are consistent with Knittel and Stango (2004), which suggests the bulk of the reduced form
correlation between prices and ATM density is driven by observations from high density markets.
60The linear relationship is: UtilChgPercentk = −0.435 + 0.081 ln(PopDensk).
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that these calculations ignore any shifts in the intensity of price competition following surcharging,
these results do suggest that surcharging may have a positive effect on consumer welfare, especially
if we focus on a population weighted average of consumer welfare.
6 Alternative Specifications
Tables A1-A3 report the results of the robustness checks we mention earlier in the paper. Table A1
compares EIV/non-EIV results from counties in which we observe relatively complete ATM data to
those in which we observe less complete data.61 Presumably, the measurement error (particularly
in competitors’ ATMs) is greater in the latter counties. If true, this would imply a greater relative
impact of the EIV correction. We find evidence in favor of this: in counties with relatively complete
data EIV results are fairly similar to non-EIV results, while in counties with incomplete data this
is not true. This suggests that our EIV-IV approach is correcting at least some of the bias.
We next estimate the model using three different imputation methods for the competitors’
ATMs. These results are described and reported in Table A2. For the most part, the results are
robust to these alternative imputation methods. While the coefficient associated with competi-
tors’ ATMs increases substantially in the last three models, this is because these models predict
lower levels of competitors’ ATMs. The welfare changes resulting from post-1996 changes in ATM
deployment and incompatibility are nearly identical in each case.
We also test the robustness of our results to the incompatibility measure, presenting these
results in Table A3. While the standard errors are larger when using these alternative measures,
the general pattern of the coefficients is unchanged.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we estimate the importance of network effects and incompatibility in a classic “hard-
ware/software” industry: Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and ATM cards. Our empirical
setting represents a rare opportunity to measure the level of incompatibility and a relatively dis-
crete change compatibility between cards and ATMs. We estimate a structural model of consumer
61One could also use the completeness of the data–for example, the fraction of banks in the local market for which
we observe data–analogously to a “reliability ratio,” which can be used in corrections for attenuation bias. However,
such corrections maintain the assumption that the actual measurement error is correlated with this share (which we
expect but can not confirm), while the Lewbel (1997) procedure makes no assumptions regarding which observations
display the greatest error.
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demand for deposit accounts (ATM cards), allowing demand to depend not only on prices and char-
acteristics directly associated with the account, but also on the ATM services provided indirectly
with the account.
We find that ATM-related services play an important role in consumer behavior regarding
deposit accounts. A bank’s own ATMs significantly affect the demand for its deposit account
services. We also find a strong indirect network effect; consumers’ willingness to pay for deposit
accounts is affected as well by the availability of competitors’ ATMs in the local market. This
suggests that other research examining ATM fees should consider the interplay between ATM fees,
ATM deployment and the demand for complementary deposit account services. More generally,
our results suggest that conducting partial analysis of markets where these effects matter may yield
misleading inference regarding consumer and/or firm behavior.
Most importantly, we identify a clear relationship between consumer behavior and the com-
patibility of products within the network system comprised by ATMs and cards. Surcharging
significantly reduces the indirect network effect associated with competitor ATMs. In the current
version of the paper, we employ the estimated parameters from this model to investigate a number
of questions. We calculate the change in consumer welfare from the introduction of surcharging,
accounting for both the change in compatibility and the increase in the number of ATMs. We
find that consumer welfare falls in markets where deployment does not offset the effects of in-
compatibility. We do find, however, that the largest markets–which also have higher population
density–experience increased welfare. It is possible that this result would be even stronger if we
considered the impact of (unobserved) ATM deployment by ISOs, who typically concentrate their
ATMs in metropolitan areas.62 This result has important implications for the policy debate in ATM
markets, and also furthers our understanding of the relationship between incompatibility and con-
sumer welfare more generally. In particular, it suggests that while incompatibility ceteris paribus
harms consumers, it can also provide strong incentives for investment in product quality. To use an
analogy from another hardware/software market, it suggests that the simultaneous existence of in-
compatible video game consoles (XBox and Playstation) may benefit rather than harm consumers.
Consumers can not mix and match games with consoles because some games are proprietary to
each console system. However, this arrangement may increase hardware developers’ incentives to
vertically integrate and invest in developing high-quality games. Indeed, both Sony and Microsoft
devote tremendous sums to in-house development of their proprietary “flagship” games.
62Dove Consulting (1999) estimates that ISOs had deployed 20,000 ATMs by 1999–roughly ten percent of the
total deployed by banks. If all of this deployment could be attributed to incompatibility, and much was concentrated
in areas of high population density, our estimates of welfare gains in urban areas might be significantly higher.
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In future work we plan to complement our demand-side analysis of ATM markets with a supply-
side model of firm behavior. At the simplest level, it should allow us to estimate the degree
to which incompatibility affects the intensity of price competition. Given that this is an open
theoretical question, we feel it is a useful empirical endeavor. Such an exercise should also allow us to
estimate the social welfare implications of policies that force compatibility, taking into account both
consumer and producer surplus. In particular, we will be able examine whether the market displays
“too much” incompatibility, or whether incompatibility leads to socially excessive deployment of
ATMs.
From a competition policy standpoint, we also may be able to identify the degree to which banks
use surcharges as a competitive device. Given the allegations that large banks use surcharges to
intentionally create incompatibility and siphon customers away from smaller banks, this is an
important line of inquiry. More generally, such analysis will improve our understanding of firms’
strategic use of incompatibility in network markets–an idea at issue in many recent antitrust cases.
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A Appendix
A.1 Tables
Table 1: ATM Deployment, Fees and Usage 1994-1999
Sources: Fee data from the Federal Reserve Board’s Annual Report to the Congress on Retail Fees and
Services of Depository Institutions, various years. Other data from Faulkner and Gray’s Card Industry
Directory, various years. Figures for total ATM deployment include ATMs deployed by banks and ISOs.
Variable: 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
ATM Fees:
Percent banks charging foreign fee: 78.4 85.3 79.8 67.0 74.5 72.3
Average foreign fee: 0.95 1.03 1.10 1.06 1.10 1.17
Percent banks charging surcharge: – – 44.8 60.1 77.9 82.9
Average surcharge: – – 1.19 1.14 1.20 1.26
ATMs (1000s): 109 123 139 165 187 227
ATM Cards (millions): 185 190 194 200 206 217
Annual ATM Transactions: 705 807 890 915 930 907
per card 45.7 51.0 55.1 54.9 54.2 50.2
per ATM (1000s) 77.5 79.0 76.8 66.5 60.0 48.0
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Table 2: Yearly Means
Variable: 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Deposit Share 0.147 0.142 0.139 0.137 0.136 0.121
ATMs 11.1 11.1 11.1 13.9 16.3 16.7
Competitors’ ATMs 128.1 108.8 106.2 122.5 150.7 179.5
Account Fees ($ per dollar of deposits/year):
Excluding Opp. Cost of Funds 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.013
Including Opp. Cost of Funds 0.048 0.062 0.058 0.060 0.060 0.057
Foreign Fee ($) 1.34 1.42 1.52 1.48 1.56 1.54
Competitors’ Surcharges ($) 0 0 0 0.81 1.01 1.25
Branches 8.7 8.5 8.9 8.7 8.7 8.5
Employees/Branch 23.4 22.1 21.4 21.4 22.9 21.4
Salary/Employee ($1000) 17.1 18.1 20.0 20.2 21.1 22.6
Number of Counties 16 17 23 43 66 79
Share with MM Accounts 0.997 0.996 0.997 0.999 0.999 1.000
Share with Brokerage Svcs. 0.729 0.737 0.767 0.842 0.881 0.894
Observations are at the bank/county/year level. Number of observations is 9348.
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Table 3: Nested Logit Results — Using variation in f +E(s−j,kt)
Variable: OLS IV EIV-IV
Price −1.42 −13.00∗∗∗ −11.63∗∗∗
(1.08) (4.84) (4.83)
ln (ATMs)j 0.044
∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.020) (0.026)
ln (ATMs)−j 0.110
∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.026) (0.033)
ln (ATMs)−j × (f +E (s−j,kt)) −0.011∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
ln (ATMs)−j × I(k ∈ St & t < 1996) −0.008 −0.009 −0.016
(0.020) (0.030) (0.022)
Branches 0.010∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Employees/Branch 0.0004 0.0011∗∗ 0.0005∗
(0.0003) (0.0006) (0.000)
Salary/Employee($1000) 0.002 0.004∗ 0.003∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln (Number of counties) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗
(0.016) (0.020) (0.018)
Offer MM Accounts? 0.121 0.094 0.119
(0.179) (0.197) (0.183)
Offer Brokerage Svcs.? 0.000 −0.013 −0.004
(0.021) (0.023) (0.022)
σ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.067) (0.053)
σ × I (year = 1995) −0.004 −0.030 −0.018
(0.009) (0.019) (0.017)
σ × I (year = 1996) −0.025∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.020) (0.018)
σ × I (year = 1997) −0.018∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗
(0.010) (0.021) (0.020)
σ × I (year = 1998) −0.035∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.024) (0.022)
σ × I (year = 1999) −0.060∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.028) (0.025)
Instruments:
Price and within share? No Yes Yes
Measurement Error? No No Yes
∗∗∗ – significant at .01 or better
∗∗ – significant at .05 or better
∗ – significant at .10 or better
Notes: N=9348. Standard Errors are in parentheses. All specifications include bank/county
and year fixed effects.
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Table 4: Aggregate Post-1996 Shifts in ATM-Related Variables
Dependent Variable:
ln (ATMs)−j ×
Variable: ln (ATMs)j ln (ATMs)−j (fjt +E (s−j,kt)) (fjt +E (s−j,kt))
t 0.101∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.023)
I (year = 1997) 0.072∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ 2.854∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.058)
I (year = 1998) 0.045∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 3.776∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.016) (0.015) (0.080)
I (year = 1999) 0.032∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ 4.525∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.020) (0.019) (0.103)
Standard errors in parentheses. Bank/County fixed effects also included.
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Table 5: Estimated Welfare Changes, 1994-1999
This table reports means and standard deviations of estimated welfare changes from surcharges. The first
three calculations hold ATMs constant, while the final three account for the increased growth of ATMs. We
use three methods for estimating the growth rates in the ATM-related variables. “Within-County Changes”
estimates a single regression with county fixed effects. “State-Level Changes” estimates a separate regression
for each state in our sample. Finally, “County-Level Changes” estimates a separate regression for each county
in our sample. Calculations use sample average 1994-1999 shifts in ATM-related variables (see Table IV).
Price units are dollars per year, per dollar of transaction deposit balances. Percent figures divide price unit
changes by (bank-level) prices.
Metric:
Price Units ($) Percent
Surcharging Only:
Within-County Changes −0.0051 −9.01%
(0.0017) (3.44)
State-Level Changes −0.0053 −9.54%
(0.0037) (6.86)
County-Level Changes: −0.0049 −8.74%
(0.0042) (7.85)
Surcharging and ATM Deployment:
Within-County Changes −0.0034 −6.05%
(0.0017) (3.26)
State-Level Changes −0.0020 −3.77%
(0.0272) (48.50)
County-Level Changes −0.0026 −4.59%
(0.0131) (23.82)
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Table 6: High and Low Travel Cost Markets
Low travel cost markets are defined as having a population density below the median, while high travel cost
markets are defined as having a population density above the median.
Variable Low Travel Costs High Travel Costs
ln (ATMs)j 0.025 0.134
∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.026)
ln (ATMs)−j 0.077 0.269
∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.034)
ln (ATMs)−j × (fjt +E (s−j,kt)) −0.026∗∗ −0.010∗∗
(0.012) (0.005)
Standard Errors are in parentheses.
Bank/County and year fixed effects are also included.
∗∗∗ denotes significance at the .01 level,
∗∗ significance at the .05 level, and
∗ denotes significance at the .10 level.
Table 7: Estimated Welfare Changes for Split Sample Model, 1994-1999
This table reports means and standard deviations of estimated welfare changes from surcharges for Low and
High Travel Cost counties. We focus on the “County-Level Changes” in ATMs to be more comparable to
Figures 3 and 4.
Low Travel Costs High Travel Costs
Price Units ($) Percent Price Units ($) Percent
Surcharging Only:
County-Level Changes: −0.0092 −16.15% −0.0052 −9.41%
(0.0086) (16.04) (0.0042) (7.65)
Surcharging and ATM Deployment:
County-Level Changes −0.0104 −18.23% 0.0808 14.47%
(0.0097) (18.13) (0.0285) (52.00)
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Table A1: Nested Logit Results–Observability and EIV-IV Results
Card ID Share>50% Card ID Share<50%
Variable No EIV EIV No EIV EIV diff-in-diff
ln (ATMs)j 0.172 0.071
∗∗ −0.074 0.111∗∗∗ −0.084
(0.164) (0.036) (0.183) (0.034)
ln (ATMs)−j 0.096 0.131
∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ −0.119
(0.101) (0.051) (0.118) (0.042)
ln (ATMs)−j × (fjt +E (s−j,kt)) −0.025 −0.010 −0.111∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.075
(0.025) (0.007) (0.038) (0.008)
Observations 3778 5360
Standard Errors are in parentheses. Bank/County and year fixed effects are also included.
∗∗∗ denotes significance at the .01 level, ∗∗ significance at the .05 level, and
∗ denotes significance at the .10 level.
Table A2: Alternative Imputation Methods
Model 2 measures issuer size using categorical variables rather than the logarithm of deposits. Model 3
imputes one ATM per branch for those which lack data. Model 4 sets ATMs per branch for these banks
equal to the median for observed banks within the same deposit level quartile. Model 5 sets ATMs per branch
equal to the median for observed banks within the same deposit level quartile for MSAs and non-MSAs.
Variable Base Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
ln (ATMs)j 0.098
∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.059 0.043
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.059) (0.056)
ln (ATMs)−j 0.174
∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.025) (0.032) (0.042) (0.042)
ln (ATMs)−j × (fjt +E (s−j,kt)) −0.014∗∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Standard Errors are in parentheses.
∗∗∗ denotes significance at the .01 level, ∗∗ significance at the .05 level, and
∗ denotes significance at the .10 level.
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Table A3: Alternative Measures of Incompatibility
Model 2 uses expected surcharges for the incompatibility measure, while Model 3 uses a post-1996 indicator
variable.
Variable Base Model 2 Model 3
ln (ATMs)j 0.098
∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.028) (0.026)
ln (ATMs)−j 0.174
∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.036) (0.034)
ln (ATMs)−j × Incomp −0.014∗∗∗∗ −0.044 −0.033
(0.005) (0.035) (0.029)
Standard Errors are in parentheses.
∗∗∗ denotes significance at the .01 level,
∗∗ significance at the .05 level, and
∗ denotes significance at the .10 level.
Table A4: Estimated Price Elasticities
Mean Median 25th Percentile 75th Percentile
Own Price Elasticity 1.214 1.195 1.023 1.372
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimate of County-Level Welfare Changes
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Figure 2: County-Level Welfare Changes and Population Density — Surcharging Only
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Figure 2: County-Level Welfare Changes and Population Density
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Figure 3: County-Level Welfare Changes For Base Model and Split Sample Model
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Figure 4: Split Sample Welfare Changes and Population Density
